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Sarah E. Hamill Of Malls and Campuses: The Regulation of University 
 Campuses and Section 2(b) of the Charter 
 
Abstract 
There have been a number of recent cases from across Canada about whether the Charter  applies 
to public universities. Courts in Alberta have suggested that the Charter will apply to public 
universities while courts in British Columbia and Ontario have refused to apply the Charter  to 
such cases. In this article I focus on the cases that also involve a claim to use university space, 
that is, those cases where there is an argument that by failing to allow an event on campus the 
university has violated the free expression guarantee in the Charter. If the Charter does apply, 
and I argue that it does, this matters for how we conceive of university property. It is too 
simplistic to hold that university property is private and, as such, section 2(b) should grant a right 
of access to some instances of university property under certain circumstances. 
 
Introduction 
“No support is needed for the proposition that universities are established in the public interest to 
serve a public purpose, or the importance, in some cases, of the physical facilities used to that 
end.”1 Here, Willcock J.A., writing for a unanimous British Columbia Court of Appeal in British 
Columbia Civil Liberties Association v. University of Victoria, linked the physical space of 
universities with their role and purpose. It was, for him, so obvious as to hardly need saying. 
However, just because the two are linked does not mean that students (or anyone else for that 
matter) have the right to access university property for the purposes of free expression.  
 The expression at issue in BCCL CA involved attempts of anti-abortion activists to hold 
graphic protests on campus, and BCCL CA is but one of a growing number of similar cases.2 
                                                 
 Lecturer, The City Law School, City, University of London. I thank Ola Malik, Lisa Austin and an anonymous 
reviewer for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. The usual caveats apply. 
1
 British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v University of Victoria , 2016 BCCA 162 at para 10 [BCCL CA] aff’g 
BC Civil Liberties Association v University of Victoria , 2015 BCSC 39 [BCCL]. 
2
 Lobo v Carleton University, 2012 ONCA 498, [2012] OJ No 3161 [Lobo]; Wilson v University of Calgary, 2014 
ABQB 190 [Wilson].  
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When these anti-abortion protests do go ahead, whether or not they have been officially 
sanctioned, the response is often vehement opposition which sometimes results in the protesters 
facing verbal and even physical attacks.3 Consequently, a number of Canada’s public universities 
have become reluctant or have refused to allow anti-abortion protests to go ahead on campus, 
whether they take the form of a demonstration or a poster display. Additionally, several anti-
abortion groups have been denied or have lost official club status which affects their ability to 
access and use campus spaces.4 Are universities entitled to prevent such protests from taking 
place and, if so, is that not a violation of the right to free expression as guaranteed by section 
2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?5 It is here courts have split, with those in 
Alberta and Saskatchewan finding that the Charter does apply to public universities and those in 
British Columbia and Ontario holding that it does not.6 
In claiming that they have the right to protest on university campuses, anti-abortion 
activists typically argue that the Charter applies to public universities and, moreover, that in 
denying access to campus space these universities are unduly infringing section 2(b) of the 
Charter.7 In so arguing, the anti-abortion groups face an uphill struggle, as it is far from clear 
that the Charter applies to public universities and, even if it does apply, it is equally uncertain 
whether it would grant them access to university property for the purposes of free expression. 
                                                 
3
 BCCL, supra  note 1 at para 58. 
4
 See, e.g., Michelle Da Silva, “Campus Crusade: Pro-Lifers Fight for Club Status at Ryerson” Now Toronto (18 
November 2015) online: www.nowtoronto.com/news/campus-crusade-pro-life-club-at-ryerson. 
5
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act, 1982 (UK), 1982, c11, s 2(b) [Charter]. Lobo, supra  note 2; BCCL, supra  note 1; Wilson, supra  note 2. The 
cases are discussed below. 
6
 R v Whatcott, 2002 SKQB 399, [2003] 4 WWR 149 [Whatcott (Regina)]; Wilson, supra  note 2. 
7
 The one exception is Gray v Alma Mater Society of the University of British Columbia , 2003 BCSC 864, 15 BCLR 
(4th) 358 [Gray] as there the anti-abortion activists conceded the point about Charter applicability. 
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Both these issues raise questions about where to draw the line between what is public and what is 
private. 
For the Charter to apply to the acts of a public university, these acts must somehow fall 
under the ambit of “government action.”8 Clearly, the Charter will not apply to a private 
university such as British Columbia’s Trinity Western University, but simply being a public 
institution does not result in a duty of Charter compliance in all spheres of institutional action. A 
number of lower courts have asserted that the question of the Charter’s applicability to public 
universities has been answered in the negative: the Charter does not apply.9 The authority they 
cite for such a claim is, however, over a quarter-century old and dealt with university policies 
about mandatory retirement.10 The hiring and retiring of university staff is hardly central to the 
specifically public functions of a university. A close reading of McKinney v. University of 
Guelph strongly suggests that the Supreme Court of Canada left room for the Charter to apply in 
other contexts; it is this reading that courts in Alberta and Saskatchewan have followed, even if 
their counterparts in Ontario and British Columbia disagree.11  
What the Ontario and British Columbia courts overlook is that since McKinney a 
substantial amount of jurisprudence has flowed from the Supreme Court about “government 
action”12 and about the role of the Charter more broadly. The more recent jurisprudence may not 
                                                 
8
 Charter, supra  note 5, s 32. For earlier discussions of the Charter and public universities see, Christopher 
Henderson, “Searching for “Government Action”: Post-Secondary Education as a Case Study in the Conceptual 
Weaknesses of the Charter’s Government Action Doctrine” (2005) 15 Educ &LJ 233; Franco Silletta, “Revisiting 
Charter Application to Universities” (2015) 20 Appeal Current L & L Reform 79; Craig Jones, “Immunizing 
Universities from Charter Review: Are We Contracting Out Censorship?” (2003) 52 UNBLJ 261. 
9
 Lobo, supra  note 2; BCCL, supra  note 2; Telfer v University of Western Ontario, 2012 ONSC 1287 [Telfer] 
10
 McKinney v University of Guelph¸ [1990] 3 SCR 229, 2 OR (3d) 319 [McKinney cited to SCR]. 
11
 Pridgen v University of Calgary, 2012 ABCA 139, 350 DLR (4th) 1 [Pridgen]; Wilson, supra  note 2; Whatcott 
(Regina), supra  note 6 at paras 40-45. 
12
 Charter, supra  note 5, s 32. 
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be specifically about universities but is about which actions must comply with the Charter ,13 the 
role of Charter values when Charter rights do not apply,14 and where and under what 
circumstances Charter rights can be exercised.15 Public universities are caught in an intersection 
of these ideas, which results in a more complicated picture than the simple claim that the Charter 
does not apply. While the periodic discussions of Charter applicability to universities have 
focused on the question of government action they have tended to overlook the physical space of 
universities themselves. Are the campuses of public universities private property? Are all parts of 
the campus private property? Is it not possible that if some of a university’s acts fall under 
government action this could matter for how we conceive of the physical space of the university 
itself?  
In this article I examine recent case law which involves not just a claim that the Charter 
applies to universities but also a claim to use campus facilities for the exercise of a Charter right, 
namely free expression. I argue that the question of free expression cannot be so readily excised 
from the question of space and that without paying attention to the tacit property law arguments, 
any victories with respect to the application of the Charter will be hollow. The reason the 
victories would be hollow is that the public-private distinction of section 32 is echoed in the 
question of what spaces are available for section 2(b) rights. In short, even if universities are 
                                                 
13
 For a discussion of this jurisprudence see, Pridgen, supra  note 11 at paras 78-99. 
14
 See, e.g., Hill v Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 SCR 1130, 24 OR (3d) 865; Mark D Walters, “Respecting 
Deference as Respect: Rights, Reasonableness and Proportionality in Canadian Administrative Law” in Hanna 
Wilberg & Mark Elliott, eds, The Scope and Intensity of Judicial Review: Traversing Taggart’s Rainbow (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2015) 395 at 412; Jamie Cameron, “Giving and Taking Offence: Civility, Respect, and Academic 
Freedom” in James L Turk, Academic Freedom in Conflict: The Struggle Over Free Speech Rights in the University 
(Toronto: James Lorimer & Co, 2014) 287 at 297-98. 
15
 See, e.g., Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v Canada, [1991] 1 SCR 139, 77 DLR (4th) 385 
[Commonwealth of Canada , cited to SCR]; Ramsden v Peterborough (City), [1993] 2 SCR 1084, 15 OR (3d) 548 
[Ramsden cited to SCR]; Montreal (city) v 2952 -1366 Quebec Inc, 2005 SCC 62, [2005] 3 SCR 141 [Montreal 
(City)]. See also, Vancouver (City) v Zhang, 2010 BCCA 450, 325 DLR (4th) 313 [Zhang]. 
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public enough for the Charter, their property might well be private and thus unavailable for 
section 2(b). 
My argument is not that all of a public university’s buildings should be open for free 
expression but that, under certain circumstances, there ought to be some space on campus which 
is open. I should also make it clear that I am not arguing for the appearance of the old public 
forum doctrine which was briefly seen in the United States.16 For one thing, it is not clear that 
university campuses are exactly comparable to malls and other types of privately-owned, yet 
publicly accessible property. My point is that the nature of universities themselves and the close 
relationship between academic freedom and free expression ought to result in their physical 
spaces being more open to free expression than they currently are.17 If certain aspects of a public 
university’s functions can fall under government action – and I argue that they can and do – then 
the application of the historical function test should result in university property being open to 
free expression.18 
I begin by briefly setting out the concepts of government action, public property, and free 
expression as they might apply to public universities in Canada. The first two concepts seem 
readily identifiable but both the practice and theory are more complex than they appear. 
Similarly, free expression has proven to be a concept in flux and there have been a number of 
controversies surrounding what constitutes free expression on campus, with a particular concern 
about safe spaces which are free from discriminatory, offensive or upsetting speech.19 The 
                                                 
16
 See e.g. Timothy Zick, “Property, Place, and Public Discourse” (2006) 21 Wash U JL & Pol’y 173. 
17
 For more on this relationship see, Cameron, supra  note 14. 
18
 The historical function test is taken from Montreal (City), supra note 15 at para 74. 
19
 This is an international concern; for some recent discussion in the American context as the result of a scandal on 
Yale University’s Campus, see, e.g., Adrienne Green, “Do Historically Black Colleges Provide the Safe Spaces 
Students are After?” The Atlantic (19 November 2015) online: 
<www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/11/are-hbcus-necessary-racial-sanctuaries/416694>; For a Canadian 
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second section examines the recent divergence between Alberta and two other provinces, namely 
British Columbia and Ontario. The third section examines what a finding of Charter applicability 
would mean for who gets to access university property to exercise section 2 (b) rights.  
 
I. Public or private: Universities and their campuses, government action, and free 
expression 
There are three questions central to the recent spate of cases about free expression on university 
campuses. These are if and when universities will be caught by the Charter’s reference to 
government action; how property is divided into public and private, particularly in the context of 
universities; and what are the values of and acceptable limits on free expression? The last 
question also calls to mind the additional one of how free expression relates to academic 
freedom. For ease of analysis, this section is sub-divided to deal with each question in turn. 
Running through each section is the difficulty of offering a clear dividing line between public 
and private. 
 
 
1. Public bodies but not government? Section 32 and public universities 
By virtue of section 32 of the Charter, the Charter only applies to “government action.” It does 
not apply to private actors and will not apply in solely private disputes, though such disputes 
                                                 
discussion see, David Watson, “Delineating Safe Spaces Key to Protecting Free Speech on University Campuses” 
The McGill Tribune (24 November 2015), online: <mcgilltribune.com/opinion/lessons-from-yale-delineating-safe-
spaces-key-to-protecting-free-speech-102937> ; See also, Cameron, supra  note 14. 
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may well fall under provincial human rights legislation.20 However, modern government is 
complex, consisting of the three traditional branches of government – the executive, the 
legislature, and the judiciary – as well as a vast administrative state whose constituent parts differ 
widely in their structure and powers, to say nothing of the various private entities and 
autonomous statutory bodies charged with implementing government policy. Consequently, the 
question of which bodies and which acts will be caught by section 32 is something of a Gordian 
knot as there is no longer (if there ever was) a clear-cut distinction between public action and 
private action.21 As yet, Canadian courts have not found a test which can untangle the knot. 
Instead, since 1982, they have, to continue the metaphor, tied themselves in knots. In this sub-
section, I offer a brief overview of section 32 jurisprudence. As will become clear, part of the 
problem lies in the fact that the test, as applied to public universities, seems subjective and has 
led to a range of different answers to the same or similar questions. 
Despite an early flurry of academic interest in synthesizing and distilling the case law on 
section 32,22 the most recent and comprehensive survey comes from Articleny J.A. of the Alberta 
Court of Appeal in Pridgen v. University of Calgary.23 Her analysis is particularly relevant given 
that she applied it to the University of Calgary. Justice Articleny identified five categories of 
“government or government activities to which the Charter applies.”24 These categories were: 
                                                 
20
 Whatcott (Regina), supra  note 6 at para 11. 
21
 For critique of the public-private divide, see: Patricia Hughes, “The Intersection of Public and Private Under the 
Charter” (2003) 52 UNBLJ 201 at 201; Allan C Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf: A Critique of Rights and Freedoms 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) at 120-128. 
22
 See, e.g., A Anne McLellan & Bruce P Elman, “To Whom Does the Charter Apply?—Some Recent Cases on 
Section 32” (1986) 24:2 Alta L Rev 361; Dale Gibson, “Distinguishing the Governors from the Governed: The 
Meaning of Government Under Section 32(1) of the Charter” (1983) 13 Man LJ 505; Gordon P Crann, “How Far 
Does the Charter Reach?—a Theoretical Review of the Section 32(1) Debate and Canada’s Emerging 
Governmental Action Doctrine” (1989) 47:1 UT Fac L Rev 156. 
23
 Pridgen supra note 11; Jennifer Koshan, “Face-ing the Charter’s Application on University Campuses” 
ABlawg.ca (13 June 2012), online: <ablawg.ca/2012/06/13/face-ing-the-charters-application-on-university-
campuses-5>. 
24
 Pridgen, supra  note 11 at para 78. 
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legislative enactments including regulations and by-laws;25 bodies that are government actors by 
nature, such as provincial governments but also municipalities;26 bodies that are government by 
virtue of the degree of legislative control over them, also known as the “government control 
test,” such as community colleges and transit authorities;27 bodies which exercise statutory 
authority and act in a “governmental capacity” particularly when such bodies have a statutorily-
granted coercive power which is greater than that exercised by a private individual;28 and “non-
governmental bodies implementing government objectives” such as hospitals.29 The last two 
categories are designed to prevent the government from “contracting out” of their constitutional 
obligations by delegating authority to non-governmental entities. These five categories are 
neither closed nor mutually exclusive.30 
As useful as Articleny J.A.’s summary is, her application to the University of Calgary has 
two drawbacks: first, the other two decisions in Pridgen did not fully discuss the Charter issue 
and secondly, McKinney remains the last word from the Supreme Court of Canada about the 
Charter’s application to universities. McKinney was one of a quartet of cases about whether a 
hospital, a community college, and two public universities were caught by section 32.31 These 
decisions were famously complex and show how confused and contradictory the Court’s 
approach to section 32 was in the early years.  A majority of the Court said that the test for 
determining if the Charter applied was the structural connection of these institutions to the 
                                                 
25
 Ibid at para 79. 
26
 Ibid at paras 80-81. 
27
 Ibid at paras 82-84; Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Association v Douglas College, [1990] 3 SCR 570, 77 DLR (4th) 
94 [Douglas/Kwantlen cited to SCR]; Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v Canadian Federation of 
Students – British Columbia Component, 2009 SCC 31, [2009] 2 SCR 295 [GVTA]. 
28
 Pridgen, supra note 11 at paras 85-93, quote from para 86 citing Godbout v Longueuil (City), [1997] 3 SCR 844 
at para 49, 152 DLR (4th) 577. 
29
 Pridgen, supra  note 11 at paras 94-98. 
30
 Ibid at para 99. 
31
 McKinney, supra  note 10; Harrison v University of British Columbia , [1990] 3 SCR 451, 77 DLR (4th) 55; 
Douglas/Kwantlen, supra note 27; Stoffman v Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 SCR 483, 76 DLR (4th) 700. 
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government; a test which centred on the degree of direct control of the government over the 
body. As such, community colleges were caught by section 32 but hospitals and universities 
were not, due the autonomy of their decision-making processes.  
In dissent, Wilson J. suggested that the better questions might be whether the government 
had “general control,” whether the body performed a government function, and whether it “acts 
pursuant to statutory authority specifically granted to it to enable it to further an objective that 
government seeks to promote in the broader public interest?”32 Confusingly, Cory and 
L’Heureux-Dubé JJ. agreed with Wilson J.’s test, though L’Heureux-Dubé J. found that it did not 
result in the Charter applying to universities. Here, L’Heureux-Dubé J. agreed with La Forest 
J.’s reasoning. In short, there was ample disagreement over which test to use and what resulted 
from the proposed tests.  
Seven years after McKinney, a unanimous Court clarified the test in Eldridge v. British 
Columbia (AG).33 Eldridge made it clear that hospitals, when they provide medically necessary 
services, namely those specified in the Hospital Insurance Act,34 are delivering “a specific 
government program.”35 However, La Forest J. was careful to point out that his conclusion in 
Eldridge was in keeping with his decision in Stoffman. Stoffman, like McKinney, dealt with 
retirement policies and as such policies are purely a matter of internal regulation they did not 
invoke the Charter. The Charter  only applies to non-governmental entities when they are 
engaging in the delivery of a governmental policy or program. 
                                                 
32
 McKinney, supra  note 10 at 370. 
33
 Eldridge v British Columbia (AG), [1997] 3 SCR 624, 151 DLR (4th) 577 [Eldridge]. 
34
 Hospital Insurance Act, RSBC, 1996, c 204. 
35
 Eldridge, supra note 33 at paras 42-52. 
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In light of the jurisprudence since McKinney, Articleny J.A. found that there were two 
routes to the Charter’s applicability to the University of Calgary. The first was the Eldridge test 
which, given that post-secondary education is a “specific objective of the Alberta legislature,” 
meant that the Charter applied to questions about student discipline.36 The second was the 
statutory compulsion framework because the disciplinary sanctions of a university went beyond 
that of a private organization.37 Notably, in Alberta, the punishments for students are set out in 
the Post-Secondary Learning Act,38 which means that a student’s relationship with the university 
is not one of contract and is akin to that of “professional regulatory bodies.”39 Nonetheless, as 
will become clear in part II, La Forest J.’s comment in McKinney that “the basis of the exercise of 
supervisory jurisdiction by the courts is not that the universities are government, but that they are 
public decision makers”40 continues to be persuasive to courts outside of Alberta and Saskatchewan. 
Such a holding means that universities are subject to administrative law but not the Charter. 
 
2. University property: public, private or both?  
In terms of attempts to access property for the purposes of free expression, the section 32 inquiry 
is only the first step in the argument. Even assuming that a court will find the Charter to apply to 
a particular body and its challenged act, such a finding does not mean that an individual will 
automatically gain the right to use that body’s property for free expression. Most free expression 
jurisprudence that also invokes the question of access to property involves municipal streets and 
                                                 
36
 Pridgen, supra  note 11 at paras 101-104. 
37
 Ibid at para 105. 
38
 Post-Secondary Learning Act, SA 2003, c P-19.5, s 31 
39
 Pridgen, supra  note 11 at paras 105-107. 
40
 McKinney, supra  note 10 at 268. 
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parks. Before examining the jurisprudence, it is helpful to unsettle the meaning of public 
property and to highlight that the same public-private divide which bedevils section 32 also 
matters for how property is understood. 
There are some forms of property which are obviously private: a person’s house, for 
example, or the offices of a corporation. Yet the common law has long recognized that some 
forms of otherwise private property are rendered public by virtue of the services they provide. 
Innkeepers offer the classic and ancient example: inns must take all comers provided that the inn 
in question has room. Such a requirement was often sweetened by the granting of a liquor license 
to innkeepers. Similarly, some forms of public property are managed as though they are private 
property. For example, the public ownership of natural resources in Canada is managed by the 
government as though these resources were private property.41 
In terms of the modern urban sphere, malls, subways, enclosed urban pathways, and 
airports are examples of property that have both public and private aspects. Sorting out which is 
which—and what that might mean for rights of access—is then further complicated by the 
absence of much theorizing about public property, or any property which is not owned by a 
private individual.42 Nevertheless, there are two main ways to categorize property as public or 
private: the owner or how that property is used. Canada follows both approaches with the inquiry 
into ownership coming first and use coming second.  
                                                 
41
 Even though such property is owned by the Crown, the common law has long recognized that Crown ownership is 
not necessarily determinative of public rights to that property. See, e.g., Reference re British Columbia Fisheries, 
[1913] UKPC 63 at 16, 5 WWR 878 (suggesting the Crown had the same rights as a private owner with respect to 
inland fisheries). 
42
 Though this trend is starting to reverse see e.g. Anna di Robilant, “Common Ownership and Equality of 
Autonomy” (2012) 58:2 McGill LJ 263; Sarah E Hamill, “Private Rights to Public Property: The Evolution of 
Common Property in Canada” (2012) 58:2 McGill LJ 365; Michael Robertson, “Common Property Redux” (2016) 
49:2 UBC L Rev 563. 
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If the property in question is privately owned, such as a mall, then even though there is an 
invitation for the public to enter the owner can revoke it at any time. While courts in the United 
States briefly flirted with the public forum doctrine which allowed free expression on properties 
like malls, they retreated from that position in the 1970s.43 Courts in Canada were never quite so 
bold and have only allowed for a deviation from the private owner’s right to exclude if it is 
mandated by legislation. Historically, labour legislation offered one exception to the whims of 
the owner,44 and today human rights protections could offer another.45 Similar anti-
discrimination provisions exist to protect would-be tenants renting dwelling spaces. The 
landlord-tenant relationship may be one of private law but it is one in which the balance of 
power has been altered by statute. We would not think that anti-discrimination provisions in 
landlord and tenant law turn rental properties into public property; they merely ensure that they 
are equally accessible to all people able to pay the rent asked. 
Although the regulation of private property necessarily affects how that property may be 
used, the question of use in a definitional sense only arises if the property is owned by 
government. Then the question becomes whether the property in question is open to the public or 
whether it is closed to the public and thus private. Examples of private government property are 
ministerial offices and army bases; such places are not ordinarily open to the public. Streets and 
parks are more obviously open to the public but even that is no guarantee that an individual may 
exercise Charter rights there. Put simply, the nature of the expressive activity must fit with the 
historical function of the property.46 Under the historical-use test, it would be doubtful if an 
                                                 
43
 See Zick, supra  note 16. 
44
 This exemption was discussed in Harrison v Carswell, [1976] 2 SRC 200 at 219, [1975] 6 WWR 673. 
45
 See Whatcott (Regina), supra  note 16 at para 11. 
46
 Montreal (City), supra  note 11 at para 74. 
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individual would win the right to hold a protest march on a major highway, as the historical 
function of such highways is hardly well-suited to expressive activity.  
The result of the owner-then-use inquiry into the nature of property is that the 
jurisprudence is deferential towards private property. Courts may well have recognized that their 
strictness here could work a disadvantage towards certain kinds of people when malls offer the 
only form of “public” space readily available to them,47 a situation which becomes all the more 
pressing during cold winter days. Of course, no Canadian court would consider the provision of 
shelter to be a government activity sufficient to invoke the Charter. To an extent, a person’s 
homelessness cannot force the government to act, but homeless people are allowed to build their 
own nighttime shelter in parks and governments cannot prevent them from so doing without 
providing alternative shelter.48 Consequently, even if people do use malls and underground 
tunnels to shelter themselves from the weather they may only do so on sufferance from the 
owner. The same rule applies for expressive activity in malls and other forms of publicly 
accessible yet privately owned property: without the owner’s permission there is no right and 
even with the owner’s permission there is only a privilege. All of which leaves a relatively 
limited physical space for free expression.49 
Assuming that the Charter  will apply to public universities, the question then becomes 
whether university property is public or private? In 1994 the Ontario Court of Appeal had 
                                                 
47
 R v Asante-Mensah, 2003 SCC 38 at para 24, [2003] 2 SCR 3. Such rules do work a disadvantage; see Parkdale 
Community Legal Services, “Submissions to the Task Force on the Law Concerning Trespass to Publicly Used 
Property as it Affects Youth and Minorities” (1997) 35:3&4 Osgoode Hall LJ 819.   This is also a problem 
elsewhere see e.g. Appleby & others v United Kingdom, No 44306/98, [2003] ECHR 222, 37 EHRR 38. 
48
 Abbotsford (City) v Shantz, 2015 BCSC 1909, 392 DLR (4th) 106; Victoria (City) v Adams, 2009 BCCA 563, 313 
DLR (4th) 29. 
49
 See also: Sarah E Hamill, “Location Matters: How Nuisance Governs Access to Property for Free Expression” 
(2014) 47:1 UBC L Rev 129 [Hamill, “Location Matters”]. 
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occasion to comment about the nature of Queen’s University campus. The case arose out of a 
lawful strike by CUPE Local 229 and centred on the question of whether the employees could 
picket in certain buildings on campus.50 Under Ontario’s labour legislation at that time, 
employees were allowed to picket on premises “to which the public normally has access and 
from which a person occupying the premises would have a right to remove individuals.”51 Such a 
rule was designed to allow picketing in malls but would it apply to universities? The campus was 
described as “comprised of privately owned buildings and property as well as municipally owned 
public streets and sidewalks.”52 As to whether the public normally had access, the parties agreed 
that university residences ought to be excluded with no picketing allowed there,53 but they 
disagreed about a particular academic building and another building which contained various 
shops and services.54 The union tried to argue that these buildings should be considered those to 
which the public ordinarily had access but this argument was unsuccessful. Technically the issue 
on appeal was whether the lower court had jurisdiction to grant an injunction against the 
picketers. Nonetheless the Court of Appeal agreed with the lower court’s determination on the 
question of property. None of the buildings at issue was open to the public in the way envisioned 
by the legislation.55 Only those with some affiliation to Queen’s, be it student, staff, faculty, 
alumni, or guest thereof, had “the right to remain and use the facilities” while others were 
“routinely” removed by security personnel.56 
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It is questionable how far Queen’s University would apply to other universities. It is not 
uncommon for universities to open up their sports facilities and libraries to members of the 
public, even if they charge a small fee for access. Similarly, members of the public might not be 
able to readily distinguish between what is municipally-owned and what is university-owned. 
They might cut across the open spaces on campus, for example. Other university campuses also 
have large public transit centres on campus, which raises questions about the public’s right to 
access campuses.57 Even if campus security does regularly remove non-affiliated people, it 
should go without saying that some kinds of people are more likely to be targeted as being non-
affiliated than others.58 If it really were the case that only affiliated people are allowed in certain 
areas, universities could install card readers such as those which are common in some British 
university buildings and which are seen at the University of Toronto’s Robarts Library.59 
Barbour v. University of British Columbia  also examined a university’s property rights.60 
Barbour was a challenge to the University of British Columbia’s (UBC) enforcement provisions 
of its parking regulations on the grounds that they were ultra vires the university’s delegated 
legislation. UBC agreed that these provisions were ultra vires but argued that it could rely on its 
common law rights as a property owner.61 There was no question as to whether UBC could 
regulate parking on campus only whether it could collect fines and tow offending vehicles. The 
British Columbia Supreme Court held that while UBC may have had the same rights as a private 
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owner,62 these rights did not include the power to tow vehicles or to collect fines.63 Following 
Barbour, the legislature of BC amended the University Act to give UBC the power to enforce its 
parking regulations and made this power retroactive.64 In other words, UBC has a statutory 
power greater than that given to private individuals with respect to regulating parking on its 
property. Notably, the court held that the “doctrine of ultra vires continues to apply to 
corporations created by special act for public purposes.”65 
A close reading of the case law on universities, either in terms of government action or 
what rights they have with respect to their property, suggests the picture is more complicated 
than it first appears. Public universities are creatures of statute and these statutes tend to grant 
universities special powers and privileges both as universities and in terms of their property. 
University legislation, for example, often exempts the campus from municipal property taxes. In 
addition, the campuses of many public universities are often made up of an inter-locking system 
of public and university property, without which the university could not function. The vast 
majority of York University’s students, staff, and faculty, for example, live beyond easy walking 
distance of campus and must drive or take transit to reach it. The same could be said for UBC, 
the University of Victoria, and the University of Manitoba, to name but a few. Public roads and 
public transit are an integral part of the York University campus and yet posted around campus 
are signs describing it as “private property.” Such signs are also posted on certain concrete 
planters on St George Street as it passes through the University of Toronto’s downtown campus. 
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Thus even if section 32 does apply to public universities, that may not be enough to make their 
property public enough for section 2(b). 
 
3. Free expression and its limits 
There can be no doubt of free expression’s importance to democracy. However, free expression 
encompasses more than just political speech; the freedom applies to just about every kind of 
speech or communication. In a theoretical sense, expressive activity is central to the development 
of “individual agency and identity”66 and, as such, it is crucial for the ways in which we 
understand ourselves and relate to one another. That being said, free expression in Canada is not 
absolute and it is limited by prohibitions on hate speech as well as certain limits with respect to 
the location and form of the expression.67 As the courts are fond of saying, the content of speech 
is protected but the form is not. The form-content divide is yet another example of the public-
private distinction, given that questions of form are about how the content, which would 
otherwise be private, is publicized. 
With respect to limits on form and location, Canadian courts have not adopted an 
identical version of the American time, manner, and place doctrine but there are echoes of it in 
Canadian jurisprudence. In the US, time, manner, and place restrictions are only constitutional if 
they are content-neutral, serve a significant governmental interest or objective, and leave open an 
alternative method of communication.68 The problem with such limits is that there is nearly 
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always an alternative method of communication. Canadian courts rarely examine alternative 
methods of communication in the justification of restrictions on expression; there is some case 
law which references, briefly and in passing, the alternate methods that could have been used by 
a person challenging the infringement of their right.69 As laudable as it might be for Canadian 
courts to have avoided the time, manner, and place doctrine, in that it does not second guess a 
person’s choice of forum, the result is much the same as in the US but with less discussion of the 
values of free expression.  
The Canadian jurisprudence on free expression has long been criticized for failing to 
grasp the social nature of the right.70 The Supreme Court may have recognized that the values 
which underlie free expression are “individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing”71 but such 
statements are rooted in a deeply individualistic understanding of the freedom entailed by section 
2 (b). Like most Charter rights, section 2(b) is designed to protect against government 
interference with a right which already exists, rather than guaranteeing access to “effective 
communication.”72 The right is not facilitative; it is preventative. Hand in hand with this 
preventative reading of section 2(b), is a judicial reluctance to open up physical space for free 
expression.73 The ideal type of expression is that which does not impinge on public space or 
impose costs on the public purse. 
In a sense the section 2(b) jurisprudence has failed to grasp that it is but a single prong of 
section 2. Section 2’s other freedoms – of conscience and religion, peaceful assembly, and 
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association – highlight the social aspects of the rights referenced. The narrow construction of 
section 2(b) and, arguably, section 2(a),74 means that these rights are viewed in an individualistic 
manner. If section 2 is looked at as a whole, the rights guaranteed under section 2(a) and (b) 
could be linked with the other, more obviously social rights protected by section 2.75 Section 2(c) 
also implicitly invokes the need for space as a “peaceful assembly” typically means (but would 
not be limited to) a group of people meeting in a particular location. Frustratingly, there is very 
little substantial jurisprudence about section 2(c) as most cases where it could be invoked also 
involve 2(b) and (d) rights. What a more holistic reading of section 2 would result in is a more 
nuanced approach to free expression, one which is perhaps more restrictive of harmful speech, 
more aware of the value of free expression, and more alert to the importance of space to 
expressive rights.76  
The current definition of hate speech by the Supreme Court is that which “a reasonable 
person, aware of the context and circumstances, would view the expression as likely to expose a 
person or persons to detestation and vilification on the basis of a prohibited ground of 
discrimination.”77 Sarah Sorial points out that such a definition focuses on the how of the 
expression rather than the content. She notes that such distinctions can miss forms of speech 
which are polite and civil yet harmful.78 In particular she focuses on the idea of “manufactured 
authority” which is hate speech disguised as part of a historical debate, such as Holocaust 
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denial.79 Holocaust denial is, of course, a slippery example of hate speech in that it is rooted in 
anti-Semitism but does not always make any overt references to its underlying motivations. 
Sorial also identifies the ways in which hate speech can be cloaked in authority either by using 
the spaces of intellectual debate, such as universities, or by adopting their tropes such as 
institutes and journals.80 
The point of Sorial, Moon, and others is that expression, because of its social nature, can 
be harmful and that the courts’ hands-off approach to content restrictions misses this particular 
harm. There is a sense in which Sorial’s argument challenges the traditional view that the truth 
will out through democratic discourse,81 yet at the same time an equally cogent argument in 
favour of Sorial’s point is that not everyone has the same resources to advance their views.82 If 
truth-seeking is truly a value of free expression then that right might need to impose more 
positive obligations than it currently does. As it is, section 2(b) appears cut-off from other 
section 2 rights and is conceptualized by the courts as an individual right which does not impose 
any positive obligations on government, only that they refrain from infringing it without 
justification. Section 2(b) is then further hindered by the courts’ reluctance to allow it to grant 
strong rights of access to public places.83 
It is telling that Sorial’s reference to “manufactured authority” invokes universities. Such 
a linkage calls two things to mind: first, the links between academic freedom and free 
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expression, and, second, the sense in which universities are a privileged space. In recent years 
the question of academic freedom has appeared with some regularity in the popular media and 
typically involves a discussion of overly restrictive speech codes, the concept of safe spaces and 
trigger warnings. Bakan, writing in the late 1990s, pointed out that some restrictions on free 
expression can actually enhance the values that underlie free expression by silencing the 
silencers. He gives the example of restrictions on homophobic speech as allowing 
LGBTTQQIA+ people to express themselves “without fear of reprisal.”84 He also gives the 
example of political correctness codes as opening up spaces for expression. He notes that “[i]n 
universities, a predominantly white, middle-class, and male professoriate has established over the 
years what methods and subjects of inquiry are valid” as well as what counts as appropriate 
behavior.85 Bakan’s point is that if we do value a diversity of views, and the arguments in favour 
of free expression suggest we do, then we need to create an environment where people can share 
such views without fear. 
In terms of academic freedom, however, Bakan points out that universities tend to be 
self-selecting, meaning that unpopular or minority views can be repressed or weeded out.86 In 
addition, for at least some academic disciplines, a small number of schools produce the majority 
of professors and this too can have a chilling effect on the diversity of views expressed. Here 
Harvard Law School’s record at producing law professors for the rest of the United States in the 
early part of the twentieth century offers a classic example.87 The point being that even if 
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faculties have an ethnically and culturally diverse professoriate, they may well have one which is 
intellectually inbred. 
Perhaps ironically, the policies about civility in universities make little mention of 
academic freedom.88 Certainly the same criticisms of these policies which Bakan described in the 
late 1990s continue to exist today, the main difference being that such efforts at political 
correctness or civility seem more widespread at the moment than they were twenty years ago. 
More worryingly, there has been a rise in what the English novelist Howard Jacobson called the 
“battleground of stated positions” and the failure to recognize that “thought can be tentative and 
argument exploratory.”89 On university campuses the result has been a push for doctrinal 
orthodoxy with respect to certain issues,90 and a kneejerk tendency to link offence with harm.91 
Jamie Cameron suggests that the better way to enforce civility might be one which is 
collaborative rather than coercive.92 Such a suggestion seems rooted in the idea that free 
expression facilitates discussion which in turn leads to truth.93 Yet it too could fall into the trap 
of forcing those who are offended, who are likely to be members of a minority, to do the work of 
explaining instead of putting the onus on the majority to understand minority viewpoints and 
take them into consideration.   
Another way of phrasing the situation might be that academic freedom is not just the 
freedom to say controversial or offensive things but the freedom to explore a diversity of 
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viewpoints before coming to a conclusion. Ironically, both the self-selecting nature of 
universities and their push for civility can undermine such a diversity of opinion. That is not to 
say that all opinions are equally valid, or indeed truthful, but, rather that if we do take seriously 
the idea that free expression is about truth-seeking in a social context we need to be exposed to 
views that differ from our own. 
 
II. Government action and university property 
The recent cases dealing with the question of free expression and access to university property 
are often not clear-cut examples of universities shutting down free speech. In fact, some involve 
affiliated student groups refusing to grant access to their space(s) on campus. Nor are these cases 
straightforward examples of rights’ infringement; they are perhaps more accurately described as 
examples of conflicting rights. For example, the University of Victoria Students’ Society refused 
to allow anti-abortion protests or signs in its building on the grounds that they violated the 
society’s commitment to gender equality and a woman’s right to choose.94 Similar objections 
exist with respect to attempts to protest homosexuality on university campuses. In other words, 
there are equality and anti-discrimination issues in play as well.95 It is not the case that any 
homophobic statements will fall under hate speech and thus that public bodies will be entitled to 
prevent or limit their expression; nor is it the case that anti-abortion protests are inherently a 
threat to gender equality. At the same time, it is also not the case that such anti-homosexuality 
and anti-abortion protesters will automatically have the right to express themselves wherever 
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they choose. I should make it clear that my point is not to defend the opinions espoused in such 
protests. I, like many others, find their views offensive; in fact, their views are probably squarely 
in the minority on most university campuses, if not in society more broadly. The fact that such 
views are in the minority should not be taken as evidence that the battle for abortion rights, 
gender equality, and equal treatment regardless of sexuality have been won. Much work remains 
to be done in these areas. My concern is whether or not the Charter ought to apply to public 
universities as they make decisions about who can access their property for the purposes of free 
expression. 
The recent spate of cases from British Columbia, Alberta, and Ontario is but the latest 
salvo in a lengthy battle over access to university property. Some ten years earlier, two cases 
from Saskatchewan and British Columbia dealt with similar issues. The first involved William 
Whatcott’s distribution of anti-abortion pamphlets on the campus of the University of Regina.96 
Whatcott was charged and convicted of “the unlawful distribution of literature on University 
property” in violation of the University of Regina’s bylaws about traffic and parking.97 Although 
the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench found the bylaws to be ultra vires the university on 
the grounds that littering had nothing to do with parking, Ball J. also held that the Charter  would 
apply in this context because by enacting parking bylaws the university was acting in the same 
way as a municipality.98 As such, the University of Regina’s regulation of its parking and traffic 
on campus was in effect a government function caught by section 32. Not surprisingly the bylaw 
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was found to violate section 2(b) of the Charter and was not saved under section 1 because a 
total ban is not minimal impairment.99 
In contrast to Whatcott (Regina), the plaintiffs in Gray v Alma Mater Society of the 
University of British Columbia  conceded that the Charter did not apply.100 Gray emerged out of 
an attempt to hold a graphic anti-abortion display on campus, similar to the display that would 
cause controversy in the more recent cases. Although the main display fell through, related 
images were posted on campus and were then destroyed by other students. Attempts to display 
the images were opposed by the Alma Mater Society (AMS) and the plaintiffs alleged that AMS 
had acted in breach of contract and its fiduciary duties by not allowing them to display their 
images.101 Absent the Charter, arguments about contractual rights and fiduciary duties were the 
only ones open to the plaintiffs. Unsurprisingly, the plaintiffs failed in their attempt to turn 
academic freedom into an enforceable, implied term of the contract between a university and its 
students,102 and in their attempt to argue that they were owed fiduciary duties.103 Justice Cohen 
observed that  
the democratic rights which the plaintiffs seek to have enforced as contractual 
terms are more appropriately dealt with in the context of constitutional law. I 
think it is a correct statement by the defence that the law of contract was never 
intended, nor is its use appropriate, to balance and determine the broad social 
rights sought to be enforced as contractual terms by the plaintiffs.104  
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Of course, the concession by the plaintiffs with respect to Charter applicability meant that the 
constitutional argument was not heard. 
The question of Charter  applicability has, however, been examined in more depth in four 
recent cases dealing with anti-abortion protests similar to those seen in Gray and Whatcott 
(Regina). In Whatcott (Calgary) the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench found the Charter  to apply 
to the actions of the University of Calgary as they sought to ban William Whatcott from its 
campus for distributing leaflets which were against homosexuality and abortion.105 In Whatcott 
(Calgary), the university attempted to use trespass legislation to prohibit Whatcott from its 
campus. The reason the university’s actions were caught by the Charter was that they amounted 
to a “denial of a learning opportunity.” As learning opportunities are an objective listed in 
Alberta’s Post-Secondary Learning Act there was a “direct connection between the institution’s 
governmental mandate and the impugned activity.”106  
Wilson, a case which has a similar fact pattern to Gray but was about the University of 
Calgary, also suggested that the Charter would apply to the university. The particular action at 
issue in Wilson was the university’s non-academic misconduct proceedings brought against 
members of an anti-abortion student group for failing to follow the instructions of campus 
security about the manner of their protest.107 The students in question raised the Charter  at every 
level of the process, including the university appeals process and the Court of Queen’s Bench.108 
The university tried to argue that the Charter did not apply but even, if it did, that it had acted 
reasonably.109 Justice Horner disagreed with the university’s claim to have acted reasonably 
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because the university appeals board did not show that they had given “due regard” to the rights 
at stake.110 However, as this was a judicial review, the appropriate remedy was for the Student 
Discipline Appeal Committee to be convened to hear the students’ case.111 Consequently, the 
question of Charter applicability was not squarely addressed, though it seems clear that Horner J. 
would have found it to apply. 
Two cases from Ontario and British Columbia, despite having a similar fact pattern to 
Wilson, found that the Charter  would not apply to the universities in question. In Lobo, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the lower court to strike the Charter claim from 
the plaintiff’s case. A unanimous Court held that when Carleton University was booking space 
for “non-academic extra-curricular use, it is not implementing a specific government policy or 
program as contemplated in Eldridge.”112 At trial, Toscano Roccamo J. made much of the fact 
that the Carleton University Act created an autonomous body in a way that differed from the 
situation in Pridgen.113   
Yet Toscano Roccamo J.’s decision was issued before the Alberta Court of Appeal’s 
decision in Pridgen. At the Court of Appeal, Articleny J.A. emphasized both the public purpose 
of post-secondary education and the coercion the university was entitled to use by way of 
statutory authority. Lobo’s dismissal of Charter applicability is thus too superficial. The Alberta 
cases, particularly Whatcott (Calgary), emphasize the link between accessing campus and the 
dissemination of knowledge and it was for this reason that the issue of access became linked to 
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the purpose of the university and thus to a governmental policy or program. As Wilson J. noted 
in her dissent in McKinney, education is a traditional function of governments in Canada and 
universities perform a public function, particularly the “free exchange of ideas.”114 One of the 
purposes of Carleton University, per its governing statute, is “the dissemination of 
knowledge.”115 Lobo’s distinction between “extra-curricular” activities and education is too 
narrow a reading of Eldridge. 
In BCCL, the British Columbia Supreme Court found that decisions about how a 
university regulates its property are a sphere of “autonomous operational decision-making 
reserved for the University.”116 Much as with Wilson and Lobo, BCCL was about an anti-
abortion student group’s attempt to book university space to hold a protest comparing abortion to 
genocide and to show related posters and movies.117 As with Lobo, Hinkson C.J.’s analysis of the 
section 32 jurisprudence left much to be desired. Instead of tracing the evolution of the test for 
section 32 applicability, Hinkson C.J. started with Eldridge and then referred to McKinney and 
Harrison.118 This pattern continued at the Court of Appeal, with Willcock J.A. observing that  
 
 [t]he question whether the University of Victoria should be regarded as an agent 
of government or equivalent to government for all purposes, insofar as the 
application of the Charter  is concerned, is settled by the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in McKinney, Stoffman and in particular Harrison.119  
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Justice Willcock dismissed any attempt to apply the Eldridge test on the grounds that “[t]he 
government neither assumed nor retained any express responsibility for the provision of a public 
forum for free expression on university campuses.”120 
However, McKinney and Harrison were about retirement policies, while Eldridge was 
about access to medical services, and this distinction is crucial. A university’s decisions over its 
staff members are not connected to a government policy or program in the same way as access to 
educational opportunities are. By holding that the decisions relating to the booking of space are 
simply about property and thus within the autonomous sphere of the university, Hinkson C.J. 
found them to be immune from Charter review. Such decisions can still be reviewed on 
administrative law grounds but the Charter will not apply.121 Here Hinkson C.J. distinguished 
Doré v. Barreau du Québec,122 because in that case the Barreau “was acting upon its express 
grant of statutory authority in the discipline of its professional member.”123 Technically, the 
Barreau conceded the point about Charter applicability and so a rigorous analysis of whether the 
Charter should apply to all administrative decision makers has not yet taken place.  
It seems strange, however, that a decision could be reviewed on administrative law 
grounds but would not have to be Charter compliant.124 Such a distinction was drawn in 
McKinney and cited with approval in Eldridge with the exact phrasing being that “the basis of 
the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction by the courts is not that universities are government, but 
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that they are public decision-makers.”125 Immediately after this quote from McKinney appeared 
in Eldridge, La Forest J. observed that “[i]n order for the Charter to apply to a private entity it 
must be found to be implementing a specific governmental policy or program.”126 In other words, 
universities are supervised by the courts because they are public but immune from Charter  
review because they are sufficiently autonomous from government to be considered private. 
Again this seems like further evidence of the courts’ struggle to find a way to distinguish public 
and private and thus figure out which actions must be Charter compliant. 
The University of Victoria may be autonomous but its authority flows from statute and so 
too does its authority to deal with matters of student discipline and to regulate its property.127 As 
such, it and other public universities seem to fit within the fourth category of section 32 cases 
identified by Articleny J.A.: “[b]odies exercising statutory authority” particularly those which 
have an authority to regulate which is greater than that of a “private citizen or corporation.”128 In 
terms of regulating university property, Whatcott (Regina) found the University of Regina to be 
acting akin to a municipality and thus the Charter would apply. As the University Act gives 
universities in British Columbia greater powers to regulate their property than exist for a private 
landowner, it seems as though the Charter should apply in questions of who can hold what 
activities on campus. Often, the property of public universities is subject to special protections 
and exemptions that,129 while not a coercive power per se, are a way to protect university 
property so that it might be used for university purposes. In other words, if a university’s role is, 
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as courts in Alberta have found, closely linked with its physical space then access to that space 
for the purposes of expression might well be protected by the Charter. 
 
IV – The Charter and University Space 
It is no surprise that public universities should seek to argue that the Charter does not apply to 
them under any circumstances. Yet it is also clear that McKinney is badly in need of an update. 
The divergence between provinces with respect to whether or not the Charter applies to public 
universities has led to calls for the Supreme Court to revisit the issue of universities and the 
Charter.130 Such calls seem particularly urgent given that current split between provinces is the 
result of different facts than were at issue in McKinney. The recent cases are about student 
discipline and attempts to access university property for the purposes of free expression.131 These 
situations are more obviously tied to the central role of universities than mandatory retirement 
policies. The need for the Supreme Court’s guidance is all the more pressing given that students, 
particularly those in anti-abortion groups, are increasingly turning to the courts to guarantee their 
rights to use university property.132 The refusal on the part of universities and university student 
societies to allow these protests or the universities’ decisions to impose stricter restrictions on 
these protests invokes a range of questions both about the limits of free expression and of the 
right of students and others to use university space for these purposes. Attempts to read Charter 
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rights into the contractual relationship between students and universities have failed.133 Yet it is 
likely that the Charter could or should apply to universities in some contexts. Justice Wilson’s 
dissent in McKinney remains pertinent and is in keeping with later decisions such as Eldridge. In 
providing education with privileges and powers granted by statute—particularly with respect to 
their students and property—universities are not as obviously exempt from the Charter  as they 
might think. Certainly, there will still be certain acts of the university which will not be caught 
by the Charter, such as mandatory retirement policies. The more interesting question is what a 
finding of Charter applicability would mean for university property and what criteria could be 
used to determine if and when such property is available for section 2 (b) rights?  
In Eldridge the issue was about enabling the access of differently-abled patients to 
medical services. It was thus an equality argument rather than one about free expression. While 
Eldridge’s finding could have an impact on hospital property—it would, for example, seem to 
require that everyone be equally able to access hospital buildings and so on—it would not grant 
anyone the right to use hospital property for free expression. As far as I am aware no one has 
argued that they have a right to free expression on hospital property. The obvious answer to such 
a claim is that a person would not have the right to use hospital property for free expression 
because that is not the purpose of hospitals. The same cannot be said for universities. 
When the Supreme Court of Canada has examined the question of access and use of 
property for free expression they have made some limits quite clear. For one thing, even when 
property is owned by government that will not automatically make it available for free 
expression. In order to determine whether government-owned property is available for free 
                                                 
133
 See Gray, supra  note 7 at para 115. 
Forthcoming in the Dalhousie Law Journal.  
33 
 
expression the Court has devised a two part test, first used by the majority in Montreal (City).134 
The first is the “historical or actual function of the place” and the second is “whether other 
aspects of the place suggest that expression within it would undermine the values underlying free 
expression.”135 In some ways this test is an extension of and an expansion on McLachlin J.’s 
discussion of public and private government property in Commonwealth of Canada .136 Some 
places such as streets and parks are clearly readily available and, historically, have been used for 
free expression. Other spaces are less clear cut, and in such circumstances the question becomes 
“[w]ould an open right to intrude and present one’s message by word or action be consistent with 
what is done in the space?”137 
Certain kinds of university property would clearly fall into the private sphere: residences, 
offices, classrooms, libraries and so on. Even the open quads and connecting pathways of 
university campuses might be more private than an ordinary street. During exam time, for 
example, a university might seek to limit the kinds of activities held in these open spaces in order 
to promote an environment conducive to studying.138 Yet this is suggestive of a stronger 
regulatory right on the part of the university, not an absolute right to ban whomever it pleases 
from campus. Here Whatcott’s activities on the University of Regina and the University of 
Calgary’s campuses provide good examples of the kind of activity that would be in keeping with 
the quiet use of a university’s open spaces.  
Thus the first question that must be asked about whether university property will be 
available for section 2(b) is does the nature of the protest fit with the normal use of the relevant 
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property?139 As such, certain kinds of posters might not be appropriate in residence buildings but 
would be more appropriate in classroom buildings, with marches and the like being similarly 
limited to non-residential buildings and areas on campus. A related second question would 
examine whether there is anything else, such as an ongoing examination period, that would 
justify placing limits on certain kinds of protests? 
Of course, university campuses have also been a traditional – if sometimes contested – 
site of protest.140 In this regard they are often more like streets, parks, and public squares than 
malls have ever been. University spaces are and have always been the site of debate and 
discussion; it seems clear that the historical function test would find free expression on university 
property to fit with the values underlying free expression. Here the nature of universities as 
institutions offers an additional justification for holding their spaces open for free expression. 
The very purpose of a university is to foster debate and discussion. It is this purpose that is often 
missed and which would perhaps continue to be missed in battles over access to university space. 
It is not just that university property is compatible with free expression but that free expression is 
central to the property in question.141  
Free expression and academic freedom do not overlap perfectly, however. Academic 
freedom is more abstract and less reliant on physical space than free expression, and is generally 
understood as being limited to the university’s researchers rather than extending to its students 
and staff. Academic freedom also speaks more to the relationships among university researchers, 
their colleagues, and superiors rather than the individual-state relationship invoked by a Charter 
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claim. Moreover, even if university campuses are suitable for free expression, as with all 
property open to free expression, the expressive right will not be absolute and can be quite 
effectively regulated, even to the point of de facto non-existence. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence has made it clear that government entities can regulate who 
uses their property and can charge fees for it. Courts will not, for example, hold that anyone can 
demand to post an advert on public transit free of charge. Yet, if a transit authority does allow 
adverts to be posted, they cannot arbitrarily prohibit certain kinds of expression, such as political 
adverts, as GVTA made clear. The transit authority’s attempt to regulate what might be 
controversial speech went too far because “[c]itizens…are expected to put up with some 
controversy in a free and democratic society.”142 
 These comments lead to a third question that ought to be asked in deciding whether 
university property will be available for free expression: is the expression at issue hate speech? 
The problem with the third question is determining what constitutes hate speech. The current 
definition is that which “incite[s] the level of abhorrence, delegitimization and rejection that risks 
causing discrimination or other harmful effects.” In other words, the goal is to guard against 
discrimination. This goal stems from the fact that the most recent case about hate speech centred 
on the definition of hatred in the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code143 and human rights codes 
are aimed at ending discrimination and promoting equality. 
How the matter of controversial or offensive speech should play out on university 
campuses is a thorny issue. As Sorial’s examination of manufactured authority and its relation to 
hate speech makes clear, universities can confer an air of legitimacy on otherwise unpalatable 
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views. She gives the example of some French universities granting “postgraduate research 
degrees for Holocaust denial theses.”144 Sorial finds this troubling on the grounds that 
intellectuals play a key role in French public life, but a more damning critique might be that the 
Holocaust as historical fact is beyond all doubt. We would not treat a World War II historian 
who denied the fact of the D-Day landings as a serious scholar, so why would we do the same for 
someone who denied the Holocaust? Academic history tends to be about the interpretation of the 
facts rather than arguing over whether something did or did not happen. 
Admittedly the distinction between facts and the interpretation of those facts can be a 
hard line to draw but it could be helpful in distinguishing hate speech from offensive speech. 
After all, hate speech typically relies on falsehoods to incite discrimination against the targeted 
group. Here Whatcott (HRC) offers a good example of the fineness of the line that is drawn 
between asserted facts and interpretations of facts. The Supreme Court upheld the Saskatchewan 
Human Rights Commission’s finding that two of Whatcott’s flyers constituted hate speech but 
overturned it with respect to two other flyers. The two which were not hate speech were reprints 
of a page of classified adverts with Whatcott’s handwritten commentary, while the two which 
were hate speech were in the style of letters or articles.145 The difference between these flyers is 
that the reprinted adverts were more obviously Whatcott’s interpretation of what the classified 
adverts represented – in this case the allegation that homosexuals are pedophiles – than the two 
letters or articles which could be more readily mistaken as fact. Admittedly, the court did not 
distinguish the flyers on the basis of asserted facts versus interpretation of evidence, but it is 
clear that is what is going on and better accounts for the line the court ultimately drew. In a 
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sense, it is also in keeping with the truth-seeking aspects of free expression, but the distinction 
between facts and interpretations of those facts often strikes a fine balance between speech we 
agree with and speech we do not. 
Assuming that the anti-abortion protests on campus fall short of hate speech and are 
merely offensive does not necessarily mean a university has to let protesters use university 
space.146 Even municipalities are entitled to regulate streets and parks out of concerns for public 
safety and free movement of people.147 The concern about safety is one which has repeatedly 
reared its head in terms of the regulation of anti-abortion protests on campus, not necessarily 
because the protesters themselves are violent but because they can provoke violent reactions.148 
Accordingly, the fourth question that ought to be asked in decisions about granting protesters the 
use of university property is whether or not the protest raises any safety concerns.  
It is, perhaps, unfair to the protesters to limit their right to free expression because of the 
reactions of others—something which is beyond their control and is effectively punishing them 
for another’s wrongful act. However, the potential for violent responses can be planned for and 
several universities have proposed that anti-abortion groups pay extra or that they would be 
charged extra to cover enhanced security.149 Such limits are precisely the kinds of limits that the 
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Supreme Court has implied would be justified in the municipal regulation of streets. In Ramsden 
v. Peterborough, for example, an outright ban on postering on lampposts and so on was struck 
down because it was overbroad, yet the Court opined that the city would be entitled to charge for 
the use of its property.150 Where such extra payments pose problems for universities is that they 
are often imposed asymmetrically and could be interpreted as a tax for holding an unpopular 
opinion. At the same time, however, the jurisprudence has made it clear that blanket bans on 
particular kinds of free expression are unacceptable. The problem with such a holding is that it is 
not a challenging bar to overcome; it is often a matter of having some kind of route to win an 
exemption, even if no such exemptions are ever granted.151 
The other issue with the question of Charter applicability is whether it only applies in the 
context of the relationship between the university and its students or whether it applies between 
the university and anyone seeking an educational opportunity. The latter situation is the 
conclusion to be drawn from Whatcott (Calgary), but it seems too broad a ruling. For one thing, 
Whatcott was unaffiliated with the university at the time of his arrest for trespass. Universities 
simply do not have the resources, or the space, to be required to let anyone access and use their 
campuses and buildings as they so choose. Understanding the Charter to govern the relationship 
between a university and its students is more in-keeping with the decision in Pridgen and 
continues to respect a university’s autonomy over who its students are. Insofar as universities can 
be caught by section 32 their acts of government only affect the university community.  
As such, the fifth question about accessing university property might be who is seeking to 
access it. Here, the line-drawing could be affected by the size and manner of the free expression. 
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Whatcott’s protests have tended to be fairly solitary and, just as municipalities require permits 
for marches but not always for distributing leaflets, the bigger problem would be if a group 
otherwise unaffiliated with the university wished to hold a demonstration on campus. Just as 
university education, even in public universities, is not free and is only open to those capable of 
reaching defined academic standards, university property is primarily for those affiliated with the 
university, even if it is publicly accessible. 
The five questions I have suggested—does the nature of the protest fit with the normal 
use of the relevant university property; is there anything else, such as an ongoing exam period, 
which would justify placing limits on certain kinds of protests; is the expression at issue hate 
speech; does the expression at issue raise any safety concerns; and who is trying to access 
university property—are not necessarily exhaustive. They are based on pre-existing case law 
about public property, university property, and free expression, but they are not a guarantee that 
university property will be available for free expression. Regardless of whether or not the 
Charter does apply to public universities, universities could use these questions to help justify 
their decision for or against granting permission for particular protests. 
Of course, even if the Charter does apply to universities when they make decisions about 
who gets to use their space, the situation may not necessarily be that different than it is now. 
Anti-abortion protesters could still find themselves unable to access campus in the way that they 
might wish to. The only potential difference would be that they have a court decision saying that 
their section 2 (b) rights have been violated but that the violation was saved by section 1 of the 
Charter. A more important conclusion from the question of who can access university space 
might be how challenging it is to actually rely on section 2(b) rights in situations where a person 
is trying to gain access to a larger communicative forum than is otherwise available to them. 
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Consequently, university campuses are more like malls in that universities retain much stronger 
rights to revoke an invitation to access than municipalities do with parks and streets. 
 
Conclusion 
Canada’s public universities might seem like the quintessential place for free expression and 
rigorous debate about controversial issues but, as this article has shown, that is not the case. 
Recent cases from across Canada have exposed both that universities and those affiliated with 
them have refused to allow certain groups to protest on campus, and that courts (with the 
exception of courts in Alberta and Saskatchewan) have upheld a university’s right to do so. As 
much as these cases raise questions about whether and in what circumstances public universities 
ought to be Charter compliant, they also raise questions about public spaces and the regulation 
of property. Insofar as public universities make claims to have private property in their 
campuses, they do not rigidly enforce this claim and, in fact, at times seem to invite members of 
the public onto campus. Even if universities are correct in their claim that they have private 
property in their campus, if the Charter does apply to them—and it seems clear that it should in 
some contexts—then university property ought to be considered at least partially public space. 
Such a finding would not grant a blanket right of access to university campuses for free 
expression but would place some limits on how a university goes about deciding which groups 
can use its spaces and for what purposes. 
 
 
 
